In this paper we develop a dynamic structural life-cycle model of labor supply behavior which fully accounts for the effects of income taxation and the transfer system. In addition to including a detailed depiction of the tax and transfer system, the model recognizes the demand side driven rationing risk that might prevent individuals from realizing their optimal labor supply state. We use this framework to study the employment effects of transforming a traditional welfare state, as is currently in place in Germany, towards a more Anglo-American system in which a large proportion of transfers are paid to the working poor.
Introduction
In this paper we develop a dynamic structural life-cycle model of labor supply behavior which explicitly accounts for the effects of income taxation and the transfer system. In addition to including a detailed depiction of the tax and transfer system, the model recognizes the demand side driven rationing risk that might prevent individuals from realizing the labor supply state that, according to life-cycle utility maximization, is optimal. This allows us to distinguish between voluntary non-employment and involuntary unemployment. This framework is used to study the employment effects of transforming a traditional welfare state, as is currently in place in Germany, towards a more Anglo-American system in which a large proportion of transfers are paid to the working poor.
Traditionally, governments have designed transfer systems and income support programs to provide assistance to the poor and thus to guarantee a degree of equity in society. However, over the last two decades, several governments have started to use the transfer system in addition as a policy instrument to increase work incentives by subsidizing work, so called in-work credits. The most prominent examples of in-work credits are the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US and the Working Tax Credit (WTC) in the UK. The idea of these programs, often referred to as "Making Work Pay" policies, is to target low income households with an income supplement that is contingent on work. In today's political discussion, in-work credits are seen as an important means of increasing work incentives for groups of individuals with high rates of non-employment.
A large empirical literature has evaluated the effects of in-work credits, most frequently the EITC or the WTC, on labor market behavior (for comprehensive surveys, see Blank, 2002 , Hotz and Scholz, 2003 . These studies are either based on ex-post evaluation methods exploiting quasi-natural experiments (e.g. Eissa and Liebman, 1996) or use semi-structural estimation techniques to evaluate policy reforms from an ex-ante perspective (see Blundell et al., 2000) . In contrast to the previous literature, we seek to evaluate the effects of in-work credits using a dynamic structural life-cycle model. The main advantage of this approach is that the structural parameters can be used to simulate the effects of proposed or hypothetical reforms to the system of in-work credits over the life-cycle while recognizing the forward looking and intertemporal nature of individuals' labor supply behavior.
The model that we propose builds on a large body of literature analyzing labor supply behavior over the life-cycle. Blundell et al. (2008) classify the life-cycle labor supply literature in two streams according to the channel through which dynamic effects enter the model. The first class of models account for saving and consumption and thus introduce dynamic effects through the intertemporal budget constraint. Preferences, however, are assumed to be intertemporally separable. This literature goes back to Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and MaCurdy (1981) . The resulting theoretical model predicts that individuals will reduce labor supply early and late in the life-cycle while using the savings channel to maintain a constat marginal utility of consumption. Several studies have used this approach to estimate the labor supply effects of tax reforms over the life-cycle. One example is Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) who model the effects of progressive income taxation on life-cycle labor supply. Using their dynamic model, the authors analyze income tax reforms occurring in the US during the 1980s and find larger labor supply effects than those found in evaluations based on static labor supply models.
In the second class of life-cycle labor supply models, to which our approach belongs, the dynamics of labor supply enter via the dependence of current preferences, prices or constraints on previous and future labor supply behavior. Models in this category allow the current employment decision to affect future labor supply behavior due to habit formation or through effects on future budget constraints due to human capital accumulation or the dependence of benefit entitlement on the individual's working history.
These models therefore capture intertemporal dependencies directly. Dynamic labor supply models of this form are part of the large literature on dynamic programming which was initiated by the contributions of Wolpin (1984) , Pakes (1986) and Rust (1987) .
To the best of our knowledge, the first study to use dynamic programming to estimate a life-cycle labor supply model was Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) who focused on the labor force participation of married women. The key feature of their model specification is that accumulated experience is endogenous in the wage process and thus the current labor supply decision affects future wages. This study has strongly influenced the following literature and the methodology has been the reference model for numerous studies of life-cycle labor supply including Adda et al. (2006) , Berkovec and Stern (1991) , Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) , Keane and Wolpin (1997) and van der Klaauw (1996) . Belzil (2007) provides an extensive survey of this literature and reviews the methodological advances and developments.
In this paper we address two central issues which we believe have not previously been included in a life-cycle model of labor supply. First, we model the demand side driven rationing of the labor supply choice. In general, in forward looking labor supply models, individuals choose their current actions so as to maximize the discounted expected value of their lifetime utility. In our framework, we additionally allow for the possibility of rationing that prevents individuals from realizing their optimal labor supply choice, resulting in involuntary unemployment. This feature of our model is similar to the treatment of involuntary unemployment adopted in the context of static models of labor supply pursued by, inter alia, Blundell et al. (1987) , Bingley and Walker (1997) and Ham (1982) . However, while in a static model rationing affects contemporaneous utilities, in a model in which individuals are forward looking the risk of involuntary unemployment affects both the current rewards and expected future benefits associated with current behavior, and individuals optimally account for these effects.
The second central issue addressed in this paper concerns the effects of the tax and transfer system on life-cycle employment behavior. In standard life-cycle models, the rewards to work are taken to be the gross rather than the net wage. Such models capture neither progressive income taxation nor the impact governmental transfers on the income of the working population. In some studies, out-of-work benefits are incorporated; Adda et al. (2007) , for example, model unemployment benefits using a time-varying replacement ratio. However the withdrawal of out-of-work transfers concurrent with employment is generally neglected. Given the importance of the tax and transfer system in all developed countries, we argue that a detailed depiction of the whole tax and transfer system is necessary to describe fully choice specific rewards and thus to capture accurately work incentives. Rust and Phelan (1997) , Blau and Gilleskie (2006), Casanova Rivas (2007) , Karlstrom et al. (2004) and Heyma (2004) argue in the same way when analyzing the effect of the social security system on retirement behavior, while Yamada (2007) includes progressive income taxation when analyzing the life-cycle employment behavior of Japanese women. However, all of these papers model only selected parts of the transfer system.
1 In contrast, in this paper we argue that, for the purpose of evaluating the effects of welfare reforms, it is necessary to model accurately the whole tax and transfer system. Indeed, due to means testing and the withdrawal of transfers, all parts of the tax and transfer system are linked and interact. Consequently, evaluating the effect of a change to one aspect of the tax and transfer system requires the entire system to be modeled. In order to obtain the precise work incentives provided by the tax and transfer system we draw on a detailed tax microsimulation model.
The proposed model is used to evaluate the life-cycle employment effects on German men of introducing a work-contingent transfer program, namely the "Employment Bonus", which is effectively a wage subsidy for low wage workers. The empirical analysis is based on panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) covering the years 2000 -2006. In the empirical analysis we focus on men of working age (25-59 years) with low or no educational qualifications, a group exhibiting high levels of both non-employment and involuntary unemployment.
In line with the previous literature we find relatively low labor supply responses for men and these are concentrated on the extensive margin. On average the Employment Bonus has a positive labor supply effect which is largest for men aged over 50 years reflecting a high sensitivity to improved work incentives for men close to the end of their working lives. We find that the largest labor supply effects of the Employment Bonus are for low educated men residing in east Germany, reflecting the focus of the Employment Bonus on men with low wages. Utilities are a function of labor market state specific net incomes, and thus the model explicitly accounts for the effects of the tax and transfer system on work incentives. Individuals are assumed to be rational and forward looking implying that every year each man acts so as to maximize his discounted expected lifetime utility.
In this analysis we focus on the labor supply behavior of men with low educational attainment and therefore modest potential earnings. This group has a relatively weak attachment to the labor market and is therefore a target group for transfer reforms aiming to increase employment. Moreover, involuntary unemployment is particularly prevalent among this group. The focus on men is mainly justified by technical reasons. Specifically, by analyzing male labor supply behavior we avoid the complications encountered when modeling fertility and part-time work, which is common among women. In thus far this paper can be seen as a first attempt at evaluating tax and transfer reforms in a structural life-cycle model. Extensions to other key labor market groups, in particular married women with children, remain for future work. When studying male labor supply behavior, we simplify the utility maximization problem of the household to the individual decision process of the man and assume the working behavior and fertility of the female spouse, if present, to be unaffected by the man's behavior. Furthermore, we restrict attention to men of prime working age, defined as 25-59 years. By excluding men aged under 25 years we avoid the complexities of modeling educational choices (see Keane and Wolpin, 1997) The model proceeds as follows. At ages t = 25, ..., 59 years individual i may seek a job with over-time hours (o), defined as 44 weekly working hours, full-time hours (f ), defined as 38.5 weekly working hours, or may choose to be non-employed (n). Hence the individual's preferred labor market state is denoted by j * ∈ {o, f, n}. This discrete distribution of hours is motivated by the empirical distribution of working hours which is discussed in Section 3. Following Blundell et al. (1987) , we distinguish preference based non-employment from demand side driven involuntary unemployment (u). In our model, an individual is involuntarily unemployed if, irrespective of his previous employment behavior, he searched for a job but was unsuccessful in finding a job with his preferred hours of work. This definition of involuntary unemployment is consistent with several sources of involuntary unemployment including frictional unemployment, minimum wage legislation and unionized wage setting. Having recognized the possibility of demand side rationing, the individual's observed labor market state is denoted by j ∈ {o, f, n, u}.
Individual i's probability of being unrationed and thus obtaining or keeping a job is given by Γ i,t . The probability of rationing depends on individual and household specific characteristics, the local unemployment rate and the individual's previous labor market state. In our framework it is not possible to distinguish between the job arrival rate and the separation rate. However, in the empirical specification, we attempt to capture variation in job arrival and separation rates by allowing the effect of the local unemployment rate to be different for those previously working over-time, those previously holding full-time jobs, these who were previously involuntary unemployed and those who where previously non-employed.
In each labor market state j = o, f, n, u the individual receives a utility U i,j,t which is a function of net income in state j, a state specific effect, the individual's demographic characteristics, including household structure variables, and the individual's previous labor market state. The inclusion of the lagged labor market state, which follows Francesconi (2002) and van der Klaauw (1996) , captures both habit formation and adjustment costs, for example job search costs.
2 Net income out-of-work is determined by non-labor income and the transfer system. Net income in over-time and full-time jobs is derived from the individual's gross wage, the hours of work associated with over-time and fulltime jobs and the tax and transfer system. Through the gross wage, the distribution of in-work incomes is conditional on individual characteristics that affect wages. We assume that non-working individuals evaluate their utility from working based on their expected wage, conditional on individual characteristics. In our specification, consumption is assumed to equal current net income. As stated by Blundell et al. (2008) , dynamic programming models of labor supply largely ignore households' saving and borrowing decisions. Rust and Phelan (1997) discuss this assumption in some detail and provide arguments in favor of equating saving with consumption, the main justification being the lack of reliable information on consumption, savings and assets in longitudinal data.
Moreover, as we employ a sample of low educated men ignoring the saving decision is less severe than in many other applications.
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The individual's decision problem can be expressed in terms of the value function V (s i,t , Y i,t−1 ) which equals the discounted expected value of the individual's utility from time t onwards assuming that in each year the individual makes his labor supply decision so as to maximize the discounted expected value of his future utility.
The value function depends on the individual's previous labor market state,
where Y i,j,t for j = o, f, n, u are indicators of individual i being in labor market state j at time t, and the state variables s i,t which consist of all other variables entering the contemporaneous utilities and the probability of rationing at time t such as net incomes and the number of children in the household. The individual is assumed to know the current value of s i,t but, at time t, may not know the values of all or some elements of s i,t+1 . However, the distribution of s i,t+1 is known to the individual at time t and it is assumed to depend only on s i,t and Y i,t .
The value function for this problem takes the following form
where V j i,t (s i,t , Y i,t−1 ) for j = o, f, n, u are employment state specific value functions with the following recursive structure
In the above δ is the discount factor. The discount factor is a crucial parameter for the life-cycle maximization, as it describes how strongly the expected life-cycle utility affects the individual's current choice. In the empirical analysis we follow the literature and assume the discount factor to be equal to 0.95. 4 In the last section we discuss the sensitivity of our results with respect to the discount factor and estimate a myopic model.
Given these definitions, the first and second arguments of the right hand side of equation (1) represent the individual's discounted expected lifetime utility if he chooses a job with respectively over-time hours or full-time hours at time t and from time t + 1 onwards makes optimal labor supply decisions. Likewise, the last argument of the right hand side of equation (1) is the man's discounted expected lifetime utility if his choice is to be non-employed today and from time t + 1 onwards he makes optimal labor supply decisions.
Equations (1) and (2a)-(2d) implicitly define the individual's optimal labor supply decision at each time t = 25, ..., 59. For the purpose of the subsequent analysis, the individual's decision problem is restated in terms of the two following quantities
The individual will choose a job with over-time hours at time t if and only if ∆ o,f ≥ 0 and ∆ o,n ≥ 0. Similarly, the individual will choose a job with full-time hours at time t if and only if ∆ o,f < 0 and ∆ o,n − ∆ o,f ≥ 0, and it will be his choice to be non-employed at time t if and only if ∆ o,n − ∆ o,f < 0 and ∆ o,n < 0. It should be noted that the nonemployed consist of individuals with a high preference for leisure who would not search for a job however low the probability of rationing and "discouraged workers" who choose not to search because the possibility of rationing makes non-employment preferable to job search.
Discussion of the model
Although only four labor market states are distinguished, the model is sufficiently general to allow an analysis of labor supply behavior on both the extensive (participation) and intensive (working hours) margins. Moreover, this model extends the previous literature on life-cycle labor supply in two important respects. First, the possibility of involuntary unemployment is recognized and the rationing process is modeled jointly with the discrete choice model of labor supply. Second, we model in detail the effect of the tax and transfer system on work incentives using a tax microsimulation model, which provides sufficient information to allow the labor supply decision to be conditioned on net, rather than gross, household income.
These extensions, however, lead to several caveats of our modeling approach. Most importantly, we cannot estimate earnings and labor supply behavior jointly as in Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) . This is because the tax microsimulation model is too involved to be included when estimating the labor supply model. Specifically, incorporating the tax microsimulation model into the dynamic programming problem implies a number of state variables that is computationally prohibitive. Instead we develop a multi-step estimation procedure, discussed below, which is similar to the two-step estimation method used by Rust and Phelan (1997) .
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A further limitation of our approach concerns the data used for the analysis. The information on household level demographics and sources of non-labor income required by the tax microsimulation model prevents us from drawing on the administrative data for Germany which has been used by Adda et al. (2006) . Instead, we use panel data from 5 Yamada (2007) follows a different approach which highlights the trade-off between the level of detail included when modeling that tax and transfer system and the estimation procedure. He models only selected features of the taxation system and working with this relatively simple structure it is possible to estimate jointly equations describing earnings and labor supply.
the Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) which include the required family and income information. However, the structure of the SOEP is such that individuals are observed only in certain years in their working lives. Therefore, as described below, the approach of Heckman (1981) is used to control for selection effects in the initial observations.
Empirical specification
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, individual i's probability of not being rationed at time t is given by
where Λ denotes the logistic distribution function. The probability of being unrationed is conditioned on observed individual and household characteristics, z i,t , the individual's previous labor market state, Y i,t−1 6 , and the local unemployment rate, r i,t . Different effects of the local unemployment rate on the probability of being rationed are allowed depending on Y i,t−1 . c i,s represents an unobserved time-invariant individual specific random effect which is distributed as described below.
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The following specification of the contemporaneous utility functions is adopted
The first term in the above represents the effect of the individual's previous labor market state on his current utility which is unrelated to net income and reflects habit formation of adjustment costs. The second term denotes the effect of the individual's net income in state j, m i,j,t , on the individual's state specific utility at time t. The relationship between net income and contemporaneous utility is determined by three different effects.
First, via variation between the labor market states in θ j , the effect of net income on current utilities depends on the individual's current labor market state, reflecting complementarity or substitutability between leisure and net income. 8 Second, the effect of net income on current utility may vary according to the individual's previous labor 6 Where required, involuntary unemployment provides the base category. 7 Potentially, mobility between the different localities might cause an endogeneity problem when estimating the rationing risk. However, over the observed period, only 135 of the 2437 households moved between different localities and only 12 of the movers changed their employment status when moving. Thus, mobility should not cause any inconsistency in the results.
8 This feature of the specification, which is repeated elsewhere, is more flexible than the alterative method of interacting an arbitrary function of leisure with the variables and then imposing common coefficients on the interacted variables across labor market states. market state reflecting, for example, a higher marginal utility of net income among individuals previously in employment than among individuals previously out-of-work which could arise from habit formation. Third, the function g determines the relationship between net income and utility conditional on the individual's current and previous labor market states. The following specification of g is employed
The above is a constant relative risk specification which allows utility to be linear in net income when ρ = 0 and logarithmic in income as ρ → 1.
The third term in equation (5) captures the effects of individual and household characteristics, x i,t , on state specific utilities at time t. The employment specific coefficients on individual characteristics allow the effects of these variables to vary according to the chosen labor market state. The time-invariant individual specific random effects c i,j for j = o, f, n, u allow individuals to have systematic differences in the unobserved components of their utilities, and are necessary to establish the extent to which persistence in labor market outcomes is due to the effect of previous employment outcomes rather than persistent unobserved individual characteristics, see Heckman (1981) and Hyslop (1999) . The last component of the utilities, ε i,j,t , captures the time-varying component of the individual's unobserved preferences.
Let ε i,t denote ε i,j,t stacked over j = o, f, n, u and let c i denote c i,k stacked over k = o, f, n, u, s. Further, we define s i,t as the state space s i,t excluding ε i,t and c i .
Estimation requires expressions for the individual's probability, conditional on s i,t , Y i,t−1 and c i , of state j * being the individual's desired labor market state at time t. Expressions for these probabilities, denoted Ω i,j * ,t ( s i,t , Y i,t−1 , c i ) for j * = o, f, n are obtained by using equations (3a) -(3b). We assume that ε i,j,t is independent over time, individuals and labor market states and has a type I extreme value distribution and, in the following we normalize ε i,u,t = ε i,n,t . 9 Manipulations yield the following multinomial logit probabilities
where
and
In equation (8) the expectation of V i,t+1 is not conditioned on ε i,t because ε i,t is independent over time. The probabilities associated with the four labor market states are as follows
Identification
Several normalizations are necessary in order to ensure identification of the model. In the equation describing the utility from involuntary unemployment, the intercept is excluded and the coefficients on the previous labor market state are normalized to zero (γ u = 0).
Following these normalizations, it is possible to identify γ j for j = o, f, n and the three remaining labor market state specific intercepts due to variation in the probability of involuntary unemployment across individuals (see equation (3b)).
It is further assumed that the effects of net income and individual and household specific characteristics on the individual's utility are the same for non-employment and involuntary unemployment. Similarly, the random effects for non-employment and involuntary unemployment are assumed to be equal (c i,n = c i,u ). These restrictions improve the identification of the model. 10 Moreover, the model specification still permits individuals to have different contemporaneous utilities in non-employment and involuntary unemployment due to systematic effects occurring through the labor market state specific intercepts or due to the effects of the man's employment history. Furthermore, differences in individual specific unobservables between the involuntary unemployed and non-employed enter through the specification of the labor market constraints in equation (4). Following these normalizations, formal identification requires that the random effect and coefficients on individual and household specific characteristics in the utilities from non-employment and involuntary unemployment be normalized to zero.
Unobserved heterogeneity
The model is estimated using distributional assumptions on c i,j for j = o, f, s. In the spirit of Heckman and Singer (1984) , the random effects have a nonparametric discrete distribution. Specifically, the random effects are constructed using the following factor loadings:
where (c This specification yields four values of the random effect c i , denoted (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ). The associated probabilities are denoted by (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ). Table 1 provides a full description of the distribution of the random effects. 
Likelihood function
The parameters of the model are estimated using Maximum Likelihood. Given a sample of N individuals whose labor market outcomes are observed at t = π i , ..., Π i , the likelihood function is as follows
In the above, the term in parenthesis is individual i's likelihood contribution conditional on a particular value of c i with p i,j denoting the probability associated with the initial observation for individual i. The individual's unconditional likelihood contribution is obtained by forming an appropriately weighted average of the conditional likelihood contributions. Following Heckman (1981) , the probability attached to the individual's initial state, p i,j , is assumed to take a flexible form and this is interpreted as a reduced form specification of the labor market outcomes observed at t = π i .
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Multi-step estimation procedure
In order to estimate the dynamic programming model of life-cycle labor supply we adopt a multi-step procedure similar to Rust and Phelan (1997) . As stressed above, a multi-step procedure is necessary for computational reasons. Maximum Likelihood estimation of the final model requires expressions for the outcome probabilities which depend on labor market state specific net household incomes and expected future value functions. Thus, 11 p i,j is assumed to take the following form
The identifying normalization b u = 0 is imposed.
the multi-step procedure requires first deriving net household incomes, which in turn involves estimating wages for non-working individuals and constructing labor market state gross household incomes. At the next step the parameters describing individuals' expectations about the future values of the state variables, including net household incomes, are estimated. The model of individuals' expectations is used in the final estimation for the purpose of computing the expected future value functions.
In order to capture the true effect of experience it is important that persistent individual specific unobserved heterogeneity is included at each estimation step (see Adda et al., 2007) . Thus at each step we incorporate individual specific random effects. However, potential correlations between these unobserved effects can not be modeled because the multi-step procedure prohibits joint estimation of the wage equations, the equations describing individuals' expectations about the evolution of the state variables and the model itself.
Gross wages and incomes
When constructing the gross labor earnings of the men, it is necessary to derive the gross wage distribution for the working and non-working populations. This is the distribution of the offered market wages which people expect to receive when working. For individuals in employment in year t we define their observed wage as their draw from the offered wage distribution. By definition, the offered wage for a working man satisfies either (3a) and (3b)).
For individuals belonging to the non-working population in year t we cannot observe their draw from the offered wage distribution. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate person specific expected gross hourly wages for non-working individuals. Using the sample of working individuals, we estimate a standard Mincerian wage equation in which log wages are conditioned measures of experience, e i,t , and further observed characteristics,
ln(wage i,t ) = κ 0 a i,t + κ 1 e i,t + ν wage i
The equation includes a individual specific random effect, ν wage i
, and an error term, (14) are estimated using GLS. Separate wage equations are estimated for east and west Germany. Table 6 in the Appendix contains further details of the specification and the estimation results.
For the non-working population, which amounts to roughly 15% of the population (see Table 1 ), we impute the mean of the distribution of offered wages, conditional on individual characteristics, and interpret this as the individual's expected gross hourly
wage. An individual's draw from the offered wage distribution has a different interpretation for the involuntary unemployed and the non-employed. We assume that for the involuntary unemployed the offered market wage implies either ∆ o,f ≥ 0 and ∆ o,n ≥ 0 or ∆ o,f < 0 and ∆ o,n − ∆ o,f ≥ 0 while for the non-employed the offered wage makes non-employment the optimal labor market state, i.e., ∆ o,n − ∆ o,f < 0 and ∆ o,n < 0.
The hourly gross wages and the labor market state specific weekly working hours define the man's gross earnings for each labor market state. For couple households, gross earnings consist of the observed labor earnings of the wife and the labor market state specific labor earnings of the husband. The latter define the labor earnings of single men. Gross household income is the sum of gross earnings and income from sources other than labor income, such as income from capital or rental income.
12 Any non-labor income is assumed to be exogenously determined.
Net household income
To translate gross household incomes into net household incomes we use the STSM tax microsimulation model which includes all relevant components of the German tax and transfer system. 13 German income tax is based on the principle of comprehensive taxation. That is, the sum of a household's incomes from all sources is taxed as a single sum after several deductions have been applied to arrive at the tax base. Income tax is computed by applying the income tax function to either the taxable income of each person in the household or of the spouses' joint taxable income, depending on marital status. 14 Income tax and employee's social security contributions are deducted from gross income, and social transfers are added to derive net household income. Social transfers include child benefits, child-rearing benefits, unemployment assistance, housing benefits and social assistance.
12 For the sample of low educated men, labor income is by far the largest component of the gross household income.
13 See Steiner et al., 2005 for a detailed description of the tax microsimulation model. 14 In Germany there exists the principle of joint taxation of households, whereby the income tax of a married couple is calculated by applying the tax function to half of the sum of the spouses' incomes; this amount is then doubled to determine the couple's tax liability.
Computation of value function and individuals' expectations
Evaluating the likelihood requires expressions for the expected value functions (9)). Conditioning on s i,t+1 , combining equations (1) and (8) and taking expectations with respect to ε i,t+1 yields
The above distributional assumptions imply
where Υ is Euler's constant.
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The quantity of interest is 
This factorization limits the number of parameters in the transition matrix of the unpredictable variables while still allowing large subsets of the variables to be jointly determined. The discrete variables are assumed to be unaffected by the man's previous employment state but the evolution of the continuous variables is conditioned on the previous labor market state.
18 Additionally, as is required by the multi-step procedure, the individual specific random effects which affect contemporaneous utilities and the probability of rationing are excluded from the transition matrices. Substituting equation (20) into equation (19) gives
where S 17 Throughout the analysis the controls for age consist of (age − 24)/10, (age − 24)
2 /1000, 1[age > 51](age − 51)/10 and 1[age > 51](age − 51) 2 /100. The latter two terms control for changes in behavior as the men approach retirement age.
18 Conditioning the probabilities of the discrete variables on the man's previous employment behavior did not substantively affect the results.
is 
Following this discretization, the integral occurring in equation (21) is approximated
The denominator in the above is necessary as it is possible that not all possible combinations of the discretized variables are observed in the sample.
Discrete Variables
The empirical specification is such that the unpredictable discrete variables consist of whether the man has a spouse and, if applicable, spouse's level of education (medium or low) and labor market state (non-employed, working part-time or working full-time) and the number of dependent children under 18 years of age (zero, one, two or three or more). 18 different combinations of these discrete variables occur in the sample.
The probability of any one of these combinations is estimated using a multinomial logit model in which the choice probabilities are conditioned on lagged dependent variables indicating which of the 18 discrete combinations of the unpredictable discrete variables applied to the household in the previous year, all possible interaction of the country of origin, the man's educational attainment and living in east Germany, and age terms.
Continuous Variables
The unpredictable continuous variables correspond to net household income if the man is working over-time, working full-time or does not have a job and the local unemployment rate. The correlation between net income in over-time and full-time work is extremely high and hence the net income in over-time work is excluded from the state space and modeled as a time-varying deterministic function, which varies according demographic variables, of net income in full-time work.
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Utilities are a function of labor market state specific net household incomes which are derived from the tax microsimulation model as described previously. However, when modeling expectations regarding future state specific net household incomes we do not apply the tax microsimulation model because the large number of state variables involved would make the dynamic programming problem too computationally intensive.
Instead we estimate reduced form equations which relate net incomes to demographic variables and previous employment outcomes in a flexible way. This modeling approach is consistent with individuals having a very detailed understanding of the tax and transfer system in the current year but relying on an approximation, specifically the reduce form equations, when forming expectations about future net incomes.
In the reduced form specification, net incomes in full-time work and non-employment are assumed to be normally distributed with means that depend on the current values of the predictable and unpredictable discrete variables detailed above and an indicator of the man was in employment in the previous year. Thus, we estimate the following equations m i,j,t = ζ t F i,t + ν
where F i,t contains various interactions between individual characteristics, lagged participation and the indicator of having a medium level of education interacted with lagged participation. The reduced form specification compounds the evolution of labor market state specific gross household incomes with the effect of the tax and transfer on net household income. Hence, although the tax and transfer system is not conditional on educational qualifications or previous working behavior, these variables are included in F i,t as they affect the evolution of gross household incomes. The coefficients in the equations describing net incomes in full-time work and non-employment are allowed to vary over time in an unrestricted fashion reflecting changes in the tax and benefit system over the sample period that affected the relationship between net incomes and demographic variables. Individuals forming expectations at time t assume that the current tax and transfer system will be maintained in the future. Since the state specific net incomes de-pend on age and the individual's previous labor market state, the specification captures the effect of human capital accumulation over the life-cycle. ν
is an individual specific random effect, assumed to be i.i.d., while m j i,t is an i.i.d. error term. The parameters of the two reduced form equations are estimated using GLS.
The local unemployment rate is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process
The above specification allows the intercept and the coefficient on previous labor market conditions to differ for east and west Germany. ν w i is an individual specific random effect, assumed to the i.i.d., while r i,t is an i.i.d. error term. The parameters describing the evolution of the conditions in the local labor market are estimated using GLS. Errors, including the random effects, in the three reduced form equations are assumed to be mutually independently.
Data and descriptive statistics
This study draws on data from the SOEP which is a representative sample of over 11,000 households living in Germany containing yearly information about working behavior and socio-economic variables at the individual and household levels. 
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In our analysis we focus on men of prime working age with low potential earnings.
More precisely, we restrict the sample to men older than 25 and younger than 59 years with either no, a low or a medium school degree and at most the lowest vocational degree.
23 School drop-outs and those with a low school degree are classified as low 20 For a detailed description of the data set, see Haisken De-New and Frick (2005) . 21 Data on the local unemployment rate are collected monthly. However, as the interviews of the SOEP are mainly conducted in the first quarter of the year we use local labor market indicators in April of each year. 22 The local unemployment rate varies between about 2% to more than 30% with an average rate of 11.68 and a variance of 33.34.
23 A tighter definition of men with low potential earnings is not possible due to the number of obser-educated while those with a medium school degree, which entails one year more study than the low school degree, are classified and medium educated. Further, we exclude self-employed men as well as men in full-time education as their labor supply behavior differs substantially from that of the rest of the population of interest. These exclusions yield a sample with 12,152 person year observations corresponding to 2,522 different men. [ Figure 1 about here]
Working behavior of men
Voluntary non-employment and involuntary unemployment
The SOEP yields information to identify the involuntary unemployed as defined above.
Each non-working individual is asked (i) whether he has actively searched for a job within the last four weeks; and (ii) whether he is ready to take up a job within the next two weeks. We follow the ILO definition and treat those who answer both questions positively as involuntarily unemployed. Table 2 shows that around half of the non-working men are involuntarily unemployed according to the above definition. Specifically, 8% of the sampled men are involuntary unemployed and 9% are non-employed. 24 The non-employed tend to be older than the average which reflects high rates of non-employment among men in their fifties, while the involuntarily unemployed tend to live in localities with relatively high unemployment vation. 24 These rates differ from official unemployment statistics since their denominators contain some of the inactive population (precisely the voluntary non-employed) and also because of selection criteria. rates. The majority of sampled men work full-time and close to 30% work over-time. The median weekly working hours for men in full-time and over-time work are, respectively, 38.5 and 44 and these values are used in the empirical analysis when deriving labor market state specific gross earnings.
Working behavior varies strongly by education and region. In Table 3 we analyze average labor market status separately for east and west Germans and by educational attainment. The share of non-working men is highest among low educated east Germans.
Specifically, 19% of low educated east Germans are non-employed while 23% are faced with involuntary unemployment. At the other extreme, 95% of men with medium education living in west Germany are in employment and the rate of involuntary unemployment for this group is only 2%. The relatively high level of voluntary non-employment among low educated east Germans is likely to partly reflect a discouragement effect whereby the low probability of finding a job deters workers from searching. In line with the differences in employment behavior, we find differences in the wage distribution. In the last column we present the median gross hourly wage, derived as described above, for each subgroup. This information is crucial to understanding the labor supply effects induced by the Employment Bonus, discussed below in the application of the model. The median wage of low educated east Germans is about 9 Euros per hour which is only half the median wage of the medium educated west Germans. Interestingly, the median wage for medium educated east Germans is markedly lower for west Germans with low education and this region matters more than education.
Labor market status over the life-cycle inverse U-shaped with a small increase in the first years and a sharp drop after age 50 years, while over-time work is monotonically decreasing with age. Involuntary unemployment is slightly higher for men under 30 than for older men, while voluntary non-employment is stable up to age 50 but beyond this age voluntary non-employment increases sharply reaching 40% by age 59 years. This trend is mainly driven by early retirement but may also reflect increasing numbers of discouraged workers. These patterns are fairly similar for subgroups defined by educational attainment or region (not shown), albeit with relatively high levels of involuntary unemployment and voluntary non-employment among the low educated and the east Germans.
Persistence in labor market status Table 4 shows the high level of persistence in labor market status over time which has been well-documented in the previous literature. Over the period of one year, persistence is close to 80% for full-time work and 64% over-time work. Voluntary non-employment is a more absorbing state than involuntary unemployment. As shown by previous studies, this persistence can be explained by a combination of unobserved and observed characteristics and by the effect of state dependence in labor supply behavior (see, for example, Hyslop, 1999) . This motivates our empirical specification which conditions current utilities on labor market status in the previous year.
Estimation results
The proposed labor supply model is characterized by non-linearities and the multiple interactions and therefore a meaningful interpretation of the coefficients is difficult. Instead, we present the predictive performance of the model and labor supply elasticities both of which are based on the structural estimates (for the coefficient estimates see tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix). In addition, the following results are important to mention: the significance of the indicators of the lagged labor market state and interactions of these variables with income implies state dependencies in men's working behavior; we find a significant effect of the local unemployment rate on the rationing probability; there is significant evidence supporting the presence of persistent unobserved heterogeneity; income and leisure are complementary and therefore, conditional on an individual's previous labor market state, a given net income yields the individual more utility if he is working full-time than if he is working over-time; and finally the estimated value of ρ, the parameter governing the extent of any concavity of utility in net income (see equation (6)) is 0.38(0.26), which is mild evidence of the utility function being concave in income and significant evidence that the utility function is less concave in income than a logarithmic function. In Figure 2 we report the in sample performance of our model. At each age, we predict the proportion of men in each labor market state and compare these to the proportions observed in the sample. We find a close correspondence between the observed and predicted outcomes over the entire life-cycle which indicates that the model performs well. According to χ 2 tests, the differences between the observed and expected frequencies of men in the four labor market states are insignificant at the 5% level at all but four ages.
In general, the in sample fit of a structural life-cycle model is not considered to be a powerful specification test. Therefore, we provide additional information about the out of sample performance of our model. Since we cannot use an external data source to validate our model, we re-estimate the model using a sub-sample containing observations Thus, we present only the overall shares. For comparative reasons we also show the predictive performance obtained using the full sample and this defines another in sample measure of the predictive performance of the model. As a measure of goodness of fit we present the squared deviations between the predicted and the observed shares.
Overall, the out of sample fit is satisfying. The sample average of the employment shares in the years 2005 can be reproduced reasonably well using only information from previous years. The accuracy of the out of sample performance of the model is underlined by comparing the squared deviations of the out of sample and in sample predictions; the two do not differ significantly.
Labor supply elasticities
In order to understand labor supply behavior over the life-cycle we derive labor supply elasticities. In this dynamic discrete choice model of labor supply it is not possible to calculate analytically labor supply elasticities. Instead we derive elasticities numerically by simulating the effect of a 10% increase in the men's gross wages. 25 In more detail, initially we simulate labor supply behavior based on the observed gross wages and the associated net household incomes. Specifically, for a subgroup of interest, labor market states at age 25 are simulated. Given labor market outcomes at age 25 years, values of the state variables at age 26 are obtained by drawing from the appropriate distribution.
Conditional on the updated state variables and the labor market outcomes at age 25 years labor market outcomes at age 26 are simulated, and so forth up to age 59 years.
Gross wages then increased by 10% and the tax microsimulation model is used to update the net household incomes. The above described simulation exercise is then repeated using the new values of the net household incomes. When performing these simulations it is assumed that the labor demand restrictions are not affected by the wage increase. In this respect our analysis is partial since we do not model potential labor demand effects of the increase in gross wages. It should further be noted that the resulting elasticities are long-run in the sense that they account for effect of the wage increase occurring through net incomes and as well as indirect effect occurring through individuals' employment histories.
In Figure 3 we present the gross wage elasticities of average working hours for four different subgroups distinguished by region of residence and educational attainment. We analyze these subgroups by simulating the life-cycle employment behavior of a large number of men who at age 25 years are single with no children. 26 The men's wages and the rate of unemployment in their local labor markets at age 25 years are taken to be the average values of these variables among the relevant group of sampled men at age 25 years.
[ Figure 3 about here]
For all groups the gross wage elasticity of working hours is slightly inverse U shaped between ages 25 and 50 years but increase markedly in the last 10 years of the working life. Averaged over the life-cycle, the elasticity is highest for low educated west Germans and lowest for medium educated east Germans. Several factors contribute to variation in the elasticities over time and between the subgroups. First, involuntary unemployment matters. Ceteris paribus, the higher the rationing risk, the lower the realized employment effects of increased work incentives. This effect is important for east Germans, particularly for the low educated, and contributes to the relatively high elasticities for west Germans. The pattern of employment over the life-cycle also impacts on the wage elasticities. In particular, the high levels of voluntary non-employment observed at the end of the working life means that there is a large pool of men over 50 years of age who 26 Each simulation is conducted using a sample size of 12000.
may be induced into the labor market by increased work incentives. State dependencies in working behavior also affect the patten of individuals' responses to increased work incentives. As mentioned above, we find significant positive dependencies in working behavior over time. This implies that increased participation and working hours among the young will ceteris paribus lead to higher participation and working hours later in the life-cycle. Thus state dependencies tend to lead to increasing elasticities over time and therefore provide a candidate explanation for the increasing elasticities in the first part of the working life and may be reinforcing the effect of age on the elasticities occurring beyond age 50 years. Of course, in a life-cycle setting, various other factors are in operation, most notably changing demographic characteristics and incentives for human capital accumulation that diminish with age, and hence it is not possible to determine exactly the driving force of the variation in the gross wage elasticities of working hours.
To better understand the labor supply behavior, we apply the decomposition suggested by McDonald and Moffitt (1980) and split the gross wage elasticity into a component due to changes on the extensive margin (a participation effect) and a component due changes on the intensive margin (a conditional working hours effect). As documented by, inter alia, Heckman (1993), Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) and Meyer (2002) [ Figure 4 about here] Figure 4 shows the decomposition of the gross wage elasticity of average working hours for the whole population (rather than for a particular subgroup). In line with the previous literature we find a relatively large effect on the extensive margin which behaves very similarly to the total elasticity. The effect on the intensive margin is negative but small in magnitude. This effect can be explained by a combination of the concavity of utility in income and by complementarities between income and leisure.
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5 The life-cycle employment effects of in-work transfers: The Employment Bonus
The German welfare system can be characterized as a traditional welfare system with relatively generous out-of-work transfers that are withdrawn at high rates when people start working. In the political discussion this has often been criticized and the low working incentives have been identified as a central reason for high unemployment, particularly among the low educated. Drawing on the international experience, mainly from EITC in the US and the WTC in the UK, there is an ongoing debate about changing the German welfare system by shifting more transfers to the working poor and thus increasing work incentives. Amongst others, Blundell (2000) , Blank (2002) and Hotz and Scholz (2003) discuss the effects of in-work credits in the UK and in the US. They find positive labor supply effects for first earners in couples and single households which are counteracted by strong negative effects for the secondary earner. The negative effects are related to the means-testing on family rather than on individual earnings.
A reform which avoids the negative secondary earner effects is the Employment Bonus, as implemented in Belgium, (see Bargain et al., 2006) . This transfer program is similar to a wage subsidy for low wage workers. Entitlement is conditioned on the individual's full-time equivalent monthly earnings, which is computed by multiplying is phased out at a taper rate of 17.8% and is fully exhausted at a full-time equivalent income of 2,000 Euro per month (corresponding to a gross wage of 11.84 Euro per hour).
The Employment Bonus therefore differs from the EITC and the WTC in several important respects. First, unlike the WTC, the Employment Bonus does not depend on a minimal number of weekly working hours but increases proportionally with working hours. Second, the entitlement is based on individual rather than on household earnings.
This means that the Employment Bonus avoids the negative secondary earner effects mentioned above. Lastly, as payments made under the Employment Bonus depend on full-time equivalized earnings rather than actual earnings, this program is targeted people with low wages rather than with low earnings.
Work incentives of the Employment Bonus
In order to understand the effects of the Employment Bonus on the work incentives we present budget lines for stylized households under the 2005 German tax and transfer system and after the Employment Bonus has been imposed on top of the 2005 system (see Figure 5 ). We focus on low wage (7.5 Euros per hour) and medium wage (10 Euros per hour) single men without children.
[ Figure 5 about here]
Depending on housing benefits, a single man receives out-of-work benefits totaling nearly 600 Euros per month. The high rate at which benefits are withdrawn means that the Employment Bonus has little effect on work incentives for men working less than 30 hours per week. However, at high hours of work the Employment Bonus vastly increases work incentives for both men. Furthermore, since the Employment Bonus is conditioned on full-time equivalent earnings, strong incentives are present even at high working hours. Also, the dependence of the subsidy on the hourly wage is clear. The man with a low wage receives close the maximum subsidy whereas the medium wage man receives only part of the subsidy.
The work incentives are very similar for couple households and this distinguishes the Employment Bonus from the WTC and the EITC. For a first earner -a household where the female spouse is not working -household out-of-work benefits are high, particularly for a household with children, and therefore the Employment Bonus affects the budget lines only at high hours of work. For a secondary earner -for example a household where the female spouse is working full-time -the Employment Bonus has a positive effect even at low working hours as this household is not eligible for out-of-work transfers.
Effects on life-cycle employment
Using the same numerical simulation method as for the gross wage elasticities, we derive the life-cycle labor supply effects induced by the Employment Bonus. In Figure 6 we present the labor supply effect of the Employment Bonus measured by the relative change in weekly working hours. We disentangle the total hours effect and present the behavioral changes along the extensive and intensive margins. As discussed above, the work incentives are highest for the low wage men. Therefore, we derive the results for the subgroup of low educated men in east Germany. In addition we also compute the average effect for the whole sample.
[ Figure 6 about here]
In general, the labor supply responses induced by the Employment Bonus are similar to those resulting from increasing gross wages. Again we find a relatively large response on the extensive margin and a minor negative effect on the intensive margin. The negative effect for the working hours conditional on employment is present even for the Employment Bonus, although over-time work is particularly attractive as the subsidy is conditioned on the full-time equivalent. This result is therefore driven by the different preferences for income in full-time and over-time work. The effects over the life-cycle have a similar shape for the group of low educated in east Germans and the sample average. The relative effects are fairly constant over the working life and only in the last working years do the responses markedly increase. We find much higher employment effects for the low educated east Germans than for the sample average. Therefore, the greater incentives created by the Employment Bonus for low wage workers more than off set the effect of high labor market restrictions in east Germany.
Forward looking versus myopia individuals
The value of the discount factor is a crucial parameter in the life-cycle model. As discussed above it is difficult to obtain a meaningful estimate of the discount factor.
Therefore, for the analysis of the life-cycle labor supply model we have imposed the relatively high discount factor of 0.95, which is commonly used in life-cycle models of household behavior. In order to understand the extent to which the estimation results depend on the choice of discount factor we re-estimate the model using the extreme case where the discount factor is zero. This scenario describes a world in which individuals' current actions are driven entirely by their current utilities and thus no weight is given to their expected future utilities. Figure 7 shows the average relative change in working hours induced by the Employment Bonus for the subgroup of east Germans with low education based on the forward looking and myopic models.
[ Figure 7 about here]
Overall, we find different employment effects depending on the assumptions about individuals' expectations. Over most of the working life the employment effects are larger in the forward looking model. Holding the estimated parameters constant in the two models, this result is intuitive particularly at the beginning of the working life. A forward looking individual understands that his current behavior affects his future income which has a positive effect on the expected utility. Of course, the parameter estimates differ between the two models. This provides a second reason why the two models imply different labor supply effects of the Employment Bonus. Indeed, differences between the parameter estimates explain why the myopic model suggests larger labor supply effect for men in their early fifties than the forward looking model. As discussed above, it is difficult to justify a high or low discount factor. Therefore, the labor supply results derived in the myopic and forward looking models should be seen as lower and upper bounds of the labor supply effects of introducing the Employment Bonus.
Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a dynamic structural life-cycle model of labor supply behavior which explicitly accounts for the effects of income taxation and the transfer system. In addition, the model recognizes the demand side driven rationing risk that might prevent individuals from realizing the labor supply state that, according to lifecycle utility maximization, is optimal. This framework allow a rigorous analysis of the employment effects of reforms to the tax and transfer system. is true for the in sample and the out of sample prediction. In line with the previous literature we find moderate labor supply responses of men which are highly concentrated at the extensive margin. On the intensive margin we find small negative effects which are due to the estimated differences in the marginal utility of income at full-time and over-time work. We find higher responses for west German men as they are less likely to be restricted on the labor market.
The model is used to evaluate the life-cycle employment effects of introducing a work-contingent transfer program in Germany, the Employment Bonus. We find that on average the Employment Bonus has a positive labor supply effect which is largest towards the end of the working life. Since the Employment Bonus is targeted at men with low earning potential, we find relatively high effects for low educated men living in east Germany.
The presented analysis can be seen as a first attempt to capture the effects of the tax and transfer system and potential fiscal reforms on life-cycle employment. Important extensions range from the joint modeling of net household income and life-cycle employment to the joint estimation of labor supply of both spouses in a household context. The latter extension, which requires modeling fertility and part-time work, will allow a study of the effect of the tax and transfer system on the life-cycle working behavior of both spouses in couple households. Predicted non−emp. Obs. invol. unemp.
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Notes: Based on χ 2 tests, the predicted and observed frequencies are significantly different at the 5% level only at ages 27, 33, 42 and 43 years. At the 1% level, the observed and expected frequencies are different only at age 43 years. 
